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Accepted Version -Contemporary Security Policy -https://doi.org/10. 1080/13523260.2018.1500819 Parliamentary involvement, party ideology and majority-opposition bargaining: Belgian participation in multinational military operations Daan Fonck a More specifically, we analyse (1) the effect of party ideology on mandate preferences, and (2) the impact of bargaining between majority and opposition parties on the outcome of mandate negotiations. On the former, our case study demonstrates that left-wing parties showed a strong inclination towards imposing restrictions on the use of military force beyond humanitarian goals, while right-wing preferences tend to depend on the national interests at stake in the operation. With regard to majority-opposition bargaining; our study shows that the impact of opposition parties is dependent on the degree of contention between government and opposition parties, as well as on the extent to which the executive needs to seek support across its own majority.
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Whether having a democratic political system constitutes a liability or an advantage when fighting wars has a been a contentious issue ever since the authoritarian Sparta defeated the democratic Athens in the Peloponnesian War (Desch, 2002, pp. 5-6) . Realists like Hans
Morgenthau and E.H. Carr suggest that significant mass influence has a detrimental impact on the effectiveness of the foreign policy of democratic regimes. In contrast, so-called democratic triumphalists point out that democracies have been at the winning side of most wars since 1815 (Desch, 2002) . More recently, scholars started examining whether or not democracies are more or less reliable allies in multinational coalitions, with authors like Patrick Mello (2018) and Atsushi Tago (2009) pointing out that the reliability of democratic allies primarily depends on domestic political conditions.
Research on national caveats, or national restrictions on what coalition militaries are
Accepted Version -Contemporary Security Policy -https://doi.org/10. 1080/13523260.2018.1500819 allowed to do, has arrived at a similar conclusions. In their groundbreaking work on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operation in Afghanistan, Stephen David Auerswald (2012, 2014) Mello, 2014; Dieterich, Hummel & Marschall, 2015; Wagner, 2018) , the effect of parliamentary involvement on the restrictions faced by national contingents has not been structurally examined.
The answer to this question matters because it sheds light on the tension between democratic control of armed forces and military effectiveness (Wagner, Peters, & Glahn, 2010, p. 11) . On the one hand, strong parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions is desirable from a democratic oversight perspective, given that it opens up governmental decision-making to public scrutiny and forces "governments to give reasons for political decisions" (Dieterich, Hummel, & Marschall, 2008, p. 4; Ruys, Ferro, & Haesebrouck, in press ). On the other hand, legislative involvement threatens to undermine executive flexibility and responsiveness, thereby assumedly having a negative impact on the effectiveness of military operations. Given that national reservations are an important challenge to the effectiveness of coalition warfare, the impact of the legislative branch on national caveats should be accounted for to assess the desirability of parliamentary involvement in decisionmaking on the use of force.
In this article, we explore the impact of parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions on the scope of the mandates of deployed forces. In particular, two main claims seem to emanate from the current scholarship, which we subject to empirical scrutiny.
First, it has been suggested that the mandate restrictions desired by political parties depends on their ideological orientation. More specifically, right-wing parties are expected to argue in favor of restrictions if there are no clear national interests at stake in the operation, left-wing parties for restrictions on the use of military force beyond humanitarian goals. Second, prior research has suggested that parliamentary involvement tends to increase the restrictions on the mandate of deployed forces because it opens up decision-making on the use of force to opposition parties and potentially sceptical backbenchers in governing parties.
Empirically, we focus on the Belgian contribution to the 2011 military intervention in Libya and the coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Iraq from 2014 onwards.
Belgium was governed by a caretaker government at the time of the Libya crisis and the 2014
Iraq intervention. Because of this particular political context, the Belgian government decided to place the decision to participate in both interventions to vote in parliament, a decision which is under normal circumstances an executive prerogative. This temporary parliamentarisation of war powers provides a unique opportunity to examine the impact of parliamentary involvement on what national militaries are allowed in multinational coalitions. We show that the Belgian case raises doubts over the conventional wisdom that parliamentary involvement increases national restrictions in coalition warfare.
Parliamentary involvement and national restrictions
Scholarly literature on national caveats began with a seminal article and subsequent book-length study of Saideman (2012, 2014) (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014, p. 65) .
Because enthusiasm for deployment is likely to vary amongst coalition partners and since the threat of government dissolution forces leaders to take the preferences of less enthusiastic partners into consideration, the authors expect coalition governments to be inclined to impose tighter restrictions on their military contingents. Building on the work of Auerswald and Saideman (2014) , Frost-Nielsen (2017) examines whether caveats in the Libya operation were the result of a bargaining process among political actors in domestic decision-making. More specifically, one of his hypotheses is that "caveats are the negotiated compromise between a government proposing to support a coalition militarily and opposition parties with veto powers skeptical to the government's proposal" (Frost-Nielsen, 2017, p. 6) . Rather than considering constraints on the mandates of military operations the result of intra-coalition bargaining, this hypothesis assumes these are the result of a compromise between government and opposition parties. Given that the latter are only represented in parliament, this suggests that parliamentary involvement in military deployment decisions makes restrictions more likely.
The latter resonates with the expanding scholarly debate about whether strong parliamentary involvement restricts a government's ability to participate in (coalition) warfare.
Several studies confirm the restriction on war involvement conjecture. Choi (2010, p. 438 ), for example, shows that legislative constraints "are likely to discourage democratic executives' use of force". Reiter and Tillman (2002, p. 824) , in turn, conclude that greater legislative control over foreign policy is associated with lower propensity to initiate conflicts. Likewise, a study (2004), as well as the successive study of Arena and Palmer (2009) , confirms this inference. Likewise, Schuster and Maier (2006, p. 233) conclude that left-wing parties were more inclined to object to the 2003 Iraq War, while Stevens (2015) shows that the UK's leftist prime minister Blair paid a higher political price for the Iraq War than the US' right-wing president Bush. Finally, the study of Massie (2016, p. 106) suggests that right-leaning executives tend to slow down decisions to withdraw from combat operations. In line with these studies, Auerswald and Saideman (2014, p. 69) assume that left-wing coalitions are more likely to impose tighter restraints on how operations are conducted.
However, academic research has moved beyond examining the binary distinction between the pro-military right and the pro-peace left. More specifically, scholars have developed more complex hypotheses on the differences between left-and right-wing parties on military action. Rathbun (2004) has introduced a three-dimension model, which suggests that leftist parties are not only more antimilitaristic, prefer operating under multilateral frameworks and have a broader conception of the national interest, which comprises the promotion of human rights (Rathbun, 2004, pp. 18-21) . Rightist parties, in turn, have a more narrow conception of the national interest, consider the use of force an acceptable instrument in international relations, and are more reluctant to delegate control to multilateral institutions. Building on the model of Rathbun, Frost-Nielsen (2017, p. 6 ) expects rightist parties to be in favor of national restrictions if there are only limited national interests at stake in the mission, while left-wing parties are expected to be in favor of restrictions to avoid "excessive use of force outside the humanitarian mandate of the mission".
Building on this prior research, two main expectations can be formulated. First, parliamentary involvement can be hypothesized to increase the restrictions on the mandate of deployed forces because it opens up decision-making on the use of force to opposition parties. (Fonck & Reykers, 2018; Reykers & Fonck, 2016) . As a result, both decisions were exceptionally brought to parliament for a formal vote of approval. In the Libya case, the decision to participate with six F16 fighter jets, a marine Following the caveats literature, one would expect that these exceptional episodes of parliamentary involvement impacted the mandate of the Belgian contribution to both coalitions.
In their analysis of national restrictions on the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, Auerswald and Saideman (2014, p. 208) already briefly referred to the Belgian participation in the Libya intervention, framing it as "perhaps the most interesting and underrated part of the Libyan campaign". Remarkably, however, they suggested that while Belgian forces "faced significant restrictions in Afghanistan", its active engagement in the air strikes over Libya was guided by a mandate "with little restrictions". The authors not only refer to the humanitarian nature of the intervention as a potential explanatory factor, but also point at domestic political factors. The caretaker status of the Belgian government in 2011 is suggested to having created a situation with "essentially no veto-players", which, according to them, together with a large parliamentary support might explain for this rather forceful mandate (Auerswald & Saideman, 2014, p. 208) .
Against the background of findings about how parliamentary involvement leads to higher national restrictions in coalition warfare, the forceful participation of Belgium in the Libya and Iraq interventions are indeed puzzling observations. They seemingly contradict the aforementioned findings about the determining effect of domestic bargaining, and hence require closer scrutiny.
Libya operation
The 
The mandate negotiation of the Belgian contribution
Given the involvement of parliament, thus including the opposition parties, in the decisionmaking process for the Libya intervention, we would expect restrictions also being imposed on the mandate of the Belgian contribution. Remarkably, however, the parliamentary resolution that authorized Belgian participation was far from a limited mandate. It requested the government to "actively collaborate in the implementation of the UNSC resolution" and did not impose limitations in terms of the duration of the Belgian involvement (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2011c, para 2). Perhaps most strikingly, the resolution furthermore contained the message that "conditions are fulfilled for a military action against the regime of Qaddafi", an issue which seemingly passed the Belgian parliamentary vote unnoticed (see also Reykers & Fonck, 2016; Fonck & Reykers, 2018) .
Retracing the negotiations leading up to the final mandate, the reasons for this remarkably broad and permissive mandate appear to be twofold. First, the parliamentary resolution was meticulously prepared by the Foreign Affairs department, instead of by the parliament itself (Reykers & Fonck, 2016: 99) . Limited by the rapidity of the decision-making process, parliament needed to discuss and agree on a pre-drafted mandate during one afternoon on the basis of an executive-drafted mandate. Second, and most crucially, interviews show there was a strong cross-party parliamentary consensus on the desirability to intervene, fed by a general resentment over Qaddafi's threats towards the opposition movements and by the opposition's strong indignation over an earlier decision of the Belgian government to approve Libya's candidacy for a seat in the UN Human Rights Council a year earlier (Interview with Foreign Affairs Official, 17 April 2015). It has been shown elsewhere how officials within the Foreign Affairs department were aware of this general atmosphere, leading them to strategically exploit this momentum (Fonck & Reykers, 2018) .
That having said, the green and socialist opposition parties did however succeed in slightly restricting the mandate elsewhere. Together with majority members they negotiated and subsequently proposed an extra condition to the parliamentary mandate which stipulated that parliamentary consultation is again required "whenever new circumstances would change the nature of the Belgian engagement" (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2011c, p. 5). This seems to be in line with Frost-Nielsen's (2017) argument that opposition parties stand sceptical to a government's proposal and will therefore seek to limit its leeway.
Concluding, the debates in parliament are clearly in line with expectations on party ideology and desired mandate restrictions, confirming the first hypothesis. A less clear verdict can be made with regard to the effect of opposition parties on the outcome of mandate bargaining. Frost-Nielsen's expectation that the inclusion of opposition parties, skeptical to the government's proposals, will result in mandate restrictions, seemed to have been mitigated by the orchestrated nature of the parliamentary involvement which inhibited a genuine government-opposition bargaining process to take place. Given these mixed results, the second hypothesis does not appear to fully hold for the case of Libya.
Anti-IS Coalition
International With regards to the mandate of the deployed forces, there were clear differences on whether or not Belgian fighter jets could also operate over Syrian territory. All green and socialist parties argued that in the absence of a mandate of the Security Council and a request The debates in the Belgian parliament, thus, confirm the expectations derived from the literature on the link between political ideology and caveats. In line with these expectations, left-leaning parties wanted a more limited mandate for the operation and argued against expanding operations to Syria. In contrast, members of right-wing parties did not argue for restrictions on the deployed forces and did not oppose extension to Syria.
The mandate negotiation of the Belgian contribution
Contrary to the Libya intervention, the parliamentary involvement in the decision about the Belgian military contribution in the coalition against ISIL in Iraq resulted in more significant restrictions being introduced by the opposition parties.
Informal negotiations on the scope of the mandate were initiated by the outgoing government, who proposed to have discussions on a draft version of the parliamentary resolution, involving both past and future coalition parties while also reaching out to opposition parties. The decision to extend talks to the opposition was particularly instructed by a desire of the incumbent-yet-in-dismissal government to assure the future to the incoming would-be majority would also support and carry out the decision to intervene (Fonck and Reykers, 2018: 15). Negotiations therefore largely followed government-opposition dynamics reflecting the incoming government coalition, and resulted in three significant amendments. 2 First, green and socialist opposition parties managed to limit the mandate of the intervention to the Iraqi territory, against the will of right-wing MPs who were in favour of including Syria. Second, the socialists also opposed including any reference to 'training, advising and assisting' or 'special exploratory missions' tasks in the final parliamentary resolution, which implied the possible deployment of special forces. Third, upon request of the greens and socialists, the parliamentary resolution explicitly stipulated a time limitation, in the sense of granting the government permission to participate in the intervention only 'for the duration of one month . Finally, after the resolution was introduced to parliament, the greens still managed to strengthen a provision on the safeguarding of human rights just before it was put to vote (Belgische Kamer van Volksvertegenwoordigers, 2014a, pp. 25-26, 28-29; 2014b, p. 4) .
Concluding, our findings on the Iraq intervention not only correspond with FrostNielsen's general conception of caveats as a 'negotiated compromise' between government and opposition parties (Frost-Nielsen, 2017, p. 6) . Even more, the predicted relation between political ideology and mandate preferences also determined the majority-opposition bargaining process. Parties oriented to the left were clearly willing to limit the territorial scope and action range of the operation and asked for humanitarian safeguards, while right-wing parties favoured a more maximalist intervention based on arguments of national interest.
Conclusion
This article intended to shed light on the implications of parliamentary involvement of national restrictions in coalition warfare. It analyzed, (1) the link between party ideology on mandate preferences, and (2) the impact of bargaining between majority and opposition parties on the outcome of mandate negotiations.
Overall, both case studies provide clear evidence that support the expected relationship between ideology and mandate preferences. While the literature expects right-wing preferences on mandate restrictions to be conditioned by the degree of national interests at stake in the operation, the anti-ISIL intervention clearly confirmed this tendency by showing their eagerness to intervene in Syria as well. Left-wing parties on the hand showed a strong inclination towards imposing restrictions on the use of military force beyond humanitarian goals.
With regard to the impact of opening up the decision-making on deploying forces to opposition parties, our findings are less conclusive. The case of Libya indicated that the influence of opposition parties was severely limited by a strong executive-driven and timeconstrained parliamentary consultation process, which prevented a genuine governmentopposition bargaining process from taking place. It furthermore showed that the cross-party hawkish consensus on the necessity to intervene failed to transform the opposition parties into inescapable veto players. The case of the anti-ISIL intervention at its turn, resulted in an effective negotiation process between government and opposition parties, with the latter being crucial players to have on board, as it included future majority members of the incoming government. In short, our study suggests that the impact of opposition parties as effective veto players on mandate bargaining is dependent on a sufficient degree of contention between Accepted Version -Contemporary Security Policy -https://doi.org/10. 1080/13523260.2018.1500819 government and opposition parties, as well as on the extent to which the executive needs to seek support across its own majority. In that sense, future research should do well in prioritizing the study of domestic bargaining processes over ideological preferences.
On a more generic level, our findings touch upon ongoing debates in the parliamentarisation literature. They particularly shed new light on the cardinal question whether increased parliamentary involvement necessarily implies a victory for parliament. The mixed findings in this article raise the importance of investigating opposite tendencies of executivedriven attempts to legitimise military interventions (see also Lagassé, 2017; Fonck and Reykers, 2018) , whereby parliamentary consultation reflects an orchestration rather than a democratization. This remains a key issue to be addressed, both in future research which seeks to establish the determinants of genuine democratic control on the use of military force, and in policy debates about changing parliamentary war powers.
